January, 1916, to February, 1917, they had only caught seven. A few others had been struck by mines, and lost or disabled through weather conditions. But the total loss of German submarines during the past 12 months from all causes was only 25, almost entirely of the smaller type. It was known that the Germans had been building more and larger submarines, and that since July they had been putting a succession of submersible cruisers into the seas. It is not too much to say that our Grand Fleet had a lively apprehension of this hidden terror. It would not put out to sea from its boomed and steel-netted shelters without an adequate escort of destroyers, of which, for all purposes, including the time for refitting, it was considered that at least 100 were required: below this number the Commander-in-Chief said he would be incurring an unjustifiable risk in the event of meeting the German High Seas Fleet. No capital ship could leave its base without a patrolling and protecting escort of small craft. If Britannia ruled the waves, she did it with a shaky trident in the days before the submarine was overcome. After the Battle of Jutland, Admiral Jellicoe came to the conclusion that it was not safe for his imposing Armada of enormous Dreadnoughts " to undertake prolonged operations to the South of the Dogger Bank," as the risk of mines and submarines was too formidable. They were not to

enter the
southern end of the North Sea unless they were
forced to do so by direct challenge from the German
High Seas Fleet. Meanwhile, the flagship must be
interned in safe creeks, the flag had to be carried on
the small craft, the nimble destroyers and the
weather-beaten trawlers. Here is the " Nelson
touch " up-to-date.